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ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Fisher's Motion to Strike Davidhizar's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
Davidhizar's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud.
Davidhizar contends that the trial court acted appropriately when it denied

Fisher's Motion to Strike Davidhizar's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment on Davidhizar's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud
because: 1) he was not dilatory in filing his memorandum in opposition to Fisher's
summary judgment motion; and 2) the trial court changed his mind and reversed his
decision denying his motion to extend the time tofilea memorandum in opposition to
Fisher's motion for summary judgment, or the trial correctly exercised discretion and
accepted his late-filed memorandum.
A.

The Trial Court's Denial ofFisher's Motion to Strike Was an Abuse of
Discretion.

Under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has the
discretion to grant a motion to enlarge time after the time for doing the act has expired,
"where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
When by these rules
an act is required or allowed to be done at or
within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where
the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend
the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e),
and 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
1

Mr. Wuthrich filed an affidavit in support of his Motion for Withdrawal of
Counsel and Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Fisher's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. at 556-557). The trial court after considering Mr. Wuthrich's affidavit
determined that Mr. Wuthrich did not justify his failure to timely file the memorandum
and denied the motion to extend the time to file a memorandum opposing Fisher's motion
for summary judgment.
On appeal, Davidhizar argues that the trial court in denying the motion to strike,
either changed his mind and reversed his decision denying the motion to extend time, or
exercised his discretion to accept a late-filed brief. Unfortunately, the trial court did not
state the grounds on which he denied the motion to strike. However, whether the trial
court changed his mind and reversed his denial of the motion to extend time, or exercised
his discretion to accept the untimely memorandum, such action was an abuse of
discretion.
The trial court's order denying or granting a motion will be upheld absent an abuse
of discretion. {Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546 (Utah,2001) at f 22). A trial court abuses
its discretion only when its "decision was against the logic of the circumstances and so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense ofjustice... [or] resultedfrombias,
prejudice, or malice." {Jones v. Layton/Okland, 214 P.3d 859 (Utah,2009) at % 25)
Under Rule 6(b)(2), the trial court could only grant Davidhizar's motion to extend
time if his attorney had established excusable neglect for failing to timelyfilethe
2

memorandum. "'[E]xcusable neglect... is an admittedly neglectful delay that is
nevertheless excused by special circumstances.'" {Reisbeckv. HCA Health Servs., 1 P.3d
447(2000,UT)at1|l3).
In this case, Davidhizar's attorney, Mr. Wuthrich, offered four justifications for
failing to meet the deadline for filing a memorandum. First, he believed that counsel had
agreed that "everything was on hold" pending attempts at settlement. Second, discovery
had not been completed. Third, he had sent his notice of withdrawal prior to receiving the
motion for summary judgment. Fourth, there was an irreconcilable conflict between two
of his clients preventing himfromrepresenting them. (R. at 556, ff 2,3; R. at 557, f4,7,
8).
The record is utterly devoid of any diligence by Mr. Wuthrich, Davidhizar or Mr.
Belnap that would justify their neglect in failing to oppose Fisher's summary judgment
motion. First, Mr. Wuthrich's claim that he believed that counsel had agreed that
"everything was on hold" pending settlement discussions, provides no basis upon which
to excuse Mr. Wuthrich's delay after he was served with Fisher's motion for summary
judgment. (See Jones, 214 P.3d 859 (Utah,2009) at lf29). Upon receiving the motion, Mr.
Wuthrich was fully aware that Fisher was proceeding with the case, yet he did not timely
respond to the motion. (Id.) Fisher also denies that there was ever such an understanding
between counsel. (R. at 579, ^fl6)
Second, Mr. Wuthrich's request for additional time based on the need for more
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discovery in order to respond to the motion for summary judgment is a Rule 56(f) motion.
Rule 56(f) allows the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file an affidavit
stating reasons why the party is presently unable to submit evidentiary affidavits in
opposition to the moving party's supporting affidavits.l
Should it appearfromthe affidavits of a party opposing a motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.(Rule 56(f), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.)
A Rule 56(f) motion has merit when it targets core issues that might defeat the
pending summary judgment motion.(Energy Management Services, LLC. v. Shaw ,110
P.3d 158,160 (Utah App.,2005) % 11) However, Mr. Wuthrich's motion and affidavit
failed to specify any issue that would have defeated the motions for summary judgment.
(R. at 556-557)
The affidavit also failed to demonstrate how discovery would be of any assistance
in Davidhizar's response to the motions for summary judgment. Mr. Wuthrich's assertion
that Davidhizar had not completed discovery and that completing discovery was crucial
for Davidhizar to respond to the motions for summary judgment does not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 56(f).
"Simply asserting that more discovery is needed and that a proper response to the
motion for summary judgment is impossible due to the other party's failure to
x

CrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241,1243 (Utah 1994)
4

cooperate with discovery requests is inadequate to overcome summary judgment.
Parties must 'offer more than conclusory assertions to demonstrate the existence of
a genuine issue for trial/ and cannot justify further discovery without providing a
viable theory as to the nature of the facts they wish to obtain. Id.; see also Jensen v.
Redevelopment Agency, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10thCir.l993)." (Grynbergv.
Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, (Utah,2003) \ 57).
Mr. Wuthrich's Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory.
"[A] party's rule 56(f) motion for a continuance is not dilatory if the party
has already initiated discovery proceedings, diligently seeks access to
information that is within the sole control of the adverse party, and is denied
an adequate opportunity to conduct the desired discovery." Western
Dairymen, 2002 UT 39 atffif27,48 P.3d 910; see also Crossland Sav., 877
P.2d at 1243-44 (addressing the timeliness of a rule 56(f) motion); Cox v.
Winters, 678 P.2d 311,312-315 (Utah 1984) (same); Strand v. Associated
Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,193-94 (Utah 1977) (same).
(Energy Management Services, L.L.C v. Shaw, 110 P.3d 158 (Utah
App.,2005)1fl2)
Davidhizar did not diligently seek access to information that was within the sole
control of Fisher, and was not denied an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.
Davidhizer failed to identify any information that was in Fisher's exclusive knowledge or
control or in the knowledge or control of any other person that would defeat the motions
for summary judgment, nor did he identify any steps he took to obtain the desired
information. (R. at 454-457) Fisher answered all of Davidhizar's requests for discovery,
he supplied thousands of pages of documents in his possession to Davidhizar, and he gave
nine hours of deposition testimony. (R. at 561, atffif12,17,24,25.) In addition,
Davidhizar had access to all the depositions, fact witnesses' depositions and to all
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witnesses. (R. at 561, at f 23,24). Yet, Mr. Wuthrich failed to identify any information
that he claimed was within Fisher's exclusive knowledge or control that would aid
Davidhizar's opposition to Fisher's motion for summary judgment.
In addition, Davidhizar had had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. He
had had more than two years and eight months to conduct discovery. He had requested
and received answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions, he had taken
depositions, and had spoken with witnesses. He had taken Fisher's deposition for
approximately nine hours. In addition, Fisher also agreed to afifthamended scheduling
order to give Davidhizar time in which to complete discovery. (R. at 562, ^[26)
The facts are that Davidhizar possessed sufficient information to file an opposing
affidavit on the issues presented in the summary judgment. Davidhizar had available to
him all of the documents in Fisher's possession, the deposition transcripts of the
defendants, deposition transcripts of witnesses, approximately three hundred pages of
Fisher's deposition transcript, and Fisher's responses to Defendants' discovery requests
which included thousands of pages of documents. (R. at 572, % 13) And, in Fisher's
deposition, Davidhizar asked questions concerning all the issues presented in the motions
for summary judgment. (R. at 578, ^f 5)
Third, Mr. Wuthrich claims that he had sent his notice of withdrawal prior to
receiving the motion for summary judgment. Although being sent before Mr. Wuthrich
received Fisher's motion for summary judgment, the notice was mailed one day after, and
6

filed six days after the motion was filed. (R. at 550). Two weeks later Mr. Wuthrich filed
his motion to withdraw and motion for extension of time to respond to Fisher's motion for
summary judgment (R. at 557,554). Regardless, until the trial court issued an order
allowing him to withdraw, Mr. Wuthrich was still Davidhizar's attorney with an ethical
obligation to protect Davidhizar's interests.
Fourth, Mr. Wuthrich failed to demonstrate that there was a conflict of interest
between co-defendants justifying the granting of the motion to extend time tofilea
memorandum. (R. at 557 % 5, 8) The motion for summary judgment concerned only
Davidhizar and not any of Mr. Wuthrich's other clients so there was no conflict of
interest for Mr. Wuthrich to represent Davidhizar in the summary judgment motion.
Simultaneous representation of co-defendants is governed by Rule 1.7.(b) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation to each client of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages andrisksinvolved.
"An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the
parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact
that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabiUties in
7

question." (Rules Of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Comment "Conflicts in Litigation").
Mr. Wuthrich failed to state the nature of the conflict and therefore, it was impossible for
the trial court to have determined if there was justification for granting the motion to
extend time. (R. at 556-557).
In addition, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Fisher's motion to strike
Davidhizar's memorandum in opposition that wasfilednearly seven months after Fisher
filed his motion for summary judgment. A seven month delay is inconsistent with the
purpose of the time limitation of Rule 7(c)(1) to prevent undue delay in a lawsuit. The 10
day time limitation for a party to file a memorandum in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment ensures that the lawsuit will either continue forward or judgment will
be entered against the non-moving party.
Having a time limitation is also consistent with the ethical obligation of an attorney
to take the necessary steps to protect a clients's interests. (Rule 1.3, Supreme Court Rules
of Professional Practice) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.") (See also Rule 1.3, Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice,
Comment [1]) (" A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer and take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf")
8

Also, Davidhizar was represented by Mr. Wuthrich for five of the seven months
between the date Fisher filed his motion for summary judgment and the date Davidhizar
filed his memorandum in opposition. And Davidhizar was also represented by Mr.
Lyman Belnap for all of those seven months, and yet neither of the attorneysfileda
memorandum or took any action to protect Davidhizar's interests. (R. at 93) Mr. Belnap
did not join in Mr. Wuthrich's motion to extend the time tofilean opposing memorandum
and did not personally file a motion to extend the time to file an opposing memorandum.
Mr. Belnap and Mr. Wuthrich resided in Idaho but did not practice in the same office.
Davidhizar argues that he was diligent in filing his memorandum because "... the
summary judgment motion corresponded with a period of transition during which Dr.
Davidhizar was trying to obtain new counsel." [Appellant's Reply Brief, at p. 24] He
attempts to justify his failure to file a memorandum for nearly seven months after he was
served with the motion and memorandum by stating that he filed the memorandum within
24 days after the trial court entered its order allowing Mr. Wuthrich to withdraw as
counsel and within 15 days after Mr. Olsenfiledhis appearance on November 10,2005.
However, as demonstrated above, there was no period of transition. Mr.
Wuthrich's motion to withdraw as counsel was not granted for approximatelyfivemonths
after Fisher's motion wasfiled,and Mr. Wuthrich was still representing Davidhizar
during those five months, and Davidhizar was also represented by Mr. Belnap during the
alleged "transition period". Both Mr. Wuthrich and Mr. Belnap had an ethical obligation
9

to take the necessary steps to protect Davidhizar's interests with reasonable diligence and
promptness. (Rule 1.3, Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice; Rule 1.3, Supreme
Court Rules of Professional Practice, Comment [1])
In summary, the trial court's denial of Fisher's summary judgment motion was an
abuse of discretion because: 1) Rule 7(c)(1) mandates Davidhizar to file a memorandum
within 10 days after he received Fisher's motion for summary judgment which he did not
do (Rule 7(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure); 2) Davidhizar failed to timely file
a motion to extend the time to file a memorandum; 3) Davidhizar failed to justify his
failure to timely file his motion to extend; 4) Davidhizar was represented by Mr. Wuthrich
for more than 5 months "during the period of transition and no action was taken to oppose
the summary judgment motion (R. at 600-601); 5) Davidhizar was also represented by Mr.
Belnap during the entire "period of transition" and he never filed a memorandum; (R. at
93); 6) Davidhizar did not obtain Mr. Olsen as additional counsel for more than 3 months
after the trial court entered an order allowing Mr. Wuthrich to withdraw and nearly 2
months after Fisher served a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel (R. 554, 600-603,
605,612); and 7) Davidhizar did not file a memorandum until 15 days after his new
counsel filed an appearance.
For the trial court to deny the motion to strike Davidhizar's memorandum in
opposition to Fisher's motion for summary judgment was against the logic of the
circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense ofjustice . To
10

allow the filing of a memorandum in opposition to a summary judgment motion seven
months after the motion was filed, without any justification for failing to obey the time
limitations for filing set by the Utah Rules of Civil procedure, having failed to file a
memorandum for seven months even though represented by counsel is arbitrary and
unreasonable and shocks one's sense ofjustice.
II.

The Trial Court Committed Error in Denying Fisher's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Davidhizar's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud.
Davidhizar argues that the trial court eired by weighing the disputed evidence in

deciding whether that evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates the occurrence of
fraud. He also argues that Fisher is asking this Court to do the same. Davidhizar
disregards the legal principle that the elements offraudmust be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. (See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991)).
Instead, he wants this Court to consider only his evidence which he contends satisfies the
clear and convincing standard of proof.
To satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof, evidence must have the
power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the facts it purports
to prove, and has an element of clinching such truth or correctness. For a matter to be
clear and convincing to a particular mind it must at least have reached the point where
there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. (See
Jardine v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454 (Utah,1955)).
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Fisher argued in his motion for summary judgment that Davidhizar could not prove
by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) Fisher made a representation concerning a
presently existing material fact which was false; and 2) he justifiably relied on Fisher's
expression of value. In his memorandum opposing the summary judgment, Davidhizar
failed to demonstrate that the evidence raises to the quantum and quality of proof which
leaves no serious or substantial doubt that: 1) Fisher made a representation concerning a
presently existing material fact which was false; and 2) he relied on Fisher's
representation.
A.

The Expression of Value is an Opinion andNot Fact.

Davidhizar argues that because Fisher's attorney calculated his opinion of value on
accounting records that his expression of value somehow becomes fact and not opinion.
Davidhizar does not cite any authority that supports that argument. And the only evidence
that he presents to show that Fisher's expression of value is fact, is that Fisher used the
actual incomes and the actual amounts billed on the doctor's contracts.
Davidhizar contends that since Fisher used the actual incomes and actual amounts
billed, his expression of value is fact because his expression does not involve a "matter of
judgment or estimation as to which men may differ." [Appellant's Reply Brief at p. 4).
Fisher used the actual amount collected and the actual amount billed for the
doctors to help form his opinion of value. Though the amount collected and the amount
billed are fact, they do not represent the value of the doctor's contracts. Fisher used those
12

numbers as a starting point, then he determined a monthly and yearly income for the
doctors' contracts. He then used one year of estimated incomes and a portion of the
estimated amount of billings to determine a value.
Since the doctors' contracts had been in existence for just a few months, men will
differ as to whether Fisher's estimation of monthly and yearly income is accurate or
appropriate, whether the value should be based on an estimated yearly income and
whether the doctors' contracts would continue earning income at the same amount each
month, and whether his judgment to base value on the estimated yearly income was
correct, etc.
In addition, Fisher's attorney told Davidhizar, and Davidhizar does not dispute
that the expression of value was Fisher's attorney's opinion based on Fisher's judgment
and estimations. (R. at 322-324,ffllOto 22; R. at 615).
Fisher told Davidhizar: 1) in a letter that "[t]he client contracts have value and
though we can disagree as to the amount of value, there is no question that they have
value (R. 322 at ^flO); 2) that the client contracts did not have a stated value and
therefore, it was difficult to value the client contracts, nevertheless, he believed that
businesses were sometimes valued by multiplying their gross income for one year by a
factor of one to seven and that it was his opinion that a business such as OMC which had
been operating for approximately two years should be valued at one to two times its gross
incomefromthe DRS tables for the period of time it had been in existence and that he had
13

chosen to multiply OMC's projected yearly income and projected yearly billing by one to
reach a value for OMC's contracts (R. 322 at p.4,1J12); (3 that it was his opinion that
OMC's client contracts should be valued at $60,000 to $80,000 and explained that the
$60,000 represented the projected income for one year on the client contracts based on the
actual income collected by OMC on each of the client contracts and the $80,000
represented the projected amount to be billed for one year on the client contracts based on
the actual amount billed by OMC on the client contracts (R. 322 at p.4, ^[13); 4) that he
arrived at that valuation by learning the amount of income collected and the amount billed
by Drs. Cutler, Jeppsen, and Ott for the DRS tables from OMC's Transaction Journal
Detail report (R. 3231 at p.5, ^fl4); 5) that he multiplied the average monthly amount of
income collected and the average monthly amount billed by each doctor by twelve to
obtain the amount that each client would produce in gross income and the amount each
client would bill in one year (R. 323 at p.5, ^15); 6) that since he did not know a better
way to value the client contracts and because the actual amount collected would be more
than $70,000 a year and the actual amount billed would be more than $200,000 a year, he
arbitrarily choose the amount of $60,000 to $80,000 in an attempt to be reasonable and
fair (R. 323 at p.5,1J15); and 7) that he estimated the amount being paid to Coder by
Boyer to be the sum of $2,000-3,000 per month which was confirmed by Coder, who also
confirmed that the money belonged to OMC (R. 323 at p.5, If 15,16,17,18; R. 324 at p. 6,
119).
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Lastly, to show that Fisher's expression of value is fact and not opinion,
Davidhizar must demonstrate that Fisher's expression of value is not his true opinion.
(Wrightv. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 513 (Utah App.,1990)) ("Ifthe stated value is
truly the owner's opinion then the buyer may not base his or herfraudclaim on that
opinion, regardless of the accuracy of the opinion.").
Davidhizar has failed to present any evidence that the representation of value by
Attorney Fisher was not his true opinion. The only evidence before the trial court was that
the representation was the true opinion of Attorney Fisher. And, it does not matter
whether Attorney Fisher's calculation of value is accurate. (Wright, at 513)
The evidence with all reasonable inferences drawn in Davidhizar's favor, is not
sufficient to prove that Fisher's expression of value is fact and not opinion. After
becoming acquainted with the evidence, there still remains serious and substantial doubt
as to whether Fisher's expression of value is a representation concerning a presently
existing material fact which was false. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that
Davidhizar did not proffer clear and convincing evidence that Attorney Fisher's
expression of value was fact and not opinion.
B.

Davidhizar Has Not Presented Clear and Convincing Evidence That
Fisher's Representation That the Contracts Were in Good Condition and
Good Standing was False.

Davidhizar argues that he has presented clear and convincing evidence that Dr.
Cutler intended to or did change/terminate his client contract prior to the February 18,
15

2002 meeting. To show he has presented clear and convincing evidence Davidhizar: 1)
cites alleged statements made by Dr. Cutler to himself and to Dennis McOmber; 2) he
cites testimony given by Coder, and 3) refers to the fact that Dr. Cutler did terminate his
contract after he had spoken with him.
Davidhizar further argues that his, McOmber's, and Coder's testimony is clear and
convincing evidence that Dr. Cutler's contract was not in good standing. He also argues
that only the testimony he presented can be considered by this Court and that this Court
cannot weigh that evidence.
A grant of summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ.
P. 56 (C). On appeal, this Court evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. {Doctors9 Co. v. Drezga, 218 P.3d 598 (Utah, 2009) at
Tf 9). This means that this Court evaluates all the evidence presented to determine if there
is a dispute of facts and not just the evidence presented by Davidhizar. Once this Court
has determined that there is a dispute of facts, it does not go on and weigh those disputed
facts to decide the issue. {Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 763 P.2d 761, 765
(Utah, 1988)).
Davidhizar also wants this Court to ignore that he has the burden to demonstrate
that the evidence satisfies the clear and convincing standard of proof. The standard of
proof dictates the quantum and quality of evidence required to prevail (Hansen v.
16

Hansen, 958 P.2d 931,934 (Utah App.,1998)). The function of a standard of proof is to
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence society thinks he should have
in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. The standard
allocates the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision. {Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., 167 P.3d 1058
(Utah,2007)atfl2).
To satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof, evidence must have the
power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact it purports to
prove, and has an element of clinching such truth or correctness. For a matter to be clear
and convincing to a particular mind it must at least have reached the point where there
remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. (See
Jardine 279 P.2d 454,457 (Utah,1955)).
Contrary to Davidhizar's assertions, the evidence with all reasonable inferences
drawn in Davidhizar's favor, is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact or
to prove that Fisher misrepresented the status of the doctors' contracts by clear and
convincing evidence.
Davidhizar attempts to create a dispute of fact by claiming that: 1) he and
McOmber were told by Dr. Cutler that he had already told Fisher his intention to change
or cancel the contract; 2) that Coder was told by Fisher that Dr. Cutler had "already
elected to opt out of his contract" and "was negotiating to make it a lease agreement"; and
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3) that comments were made in a meeting with Fisher, Attorney Fisher, and Cheryl Fisher
that Dr. Cutler was not happy and he wanted out of his contract and that Fisher was
negotiating the lease agreement. [Appellant's Reply Brief at pp. 6-7].
These facts are insufficient to satisfy Davidhizar's burden of proof because these
facts are contradicted by the testimony of Dr. Cutler and David Fisher and because the
testimony of Davidhizar, Coder and McOmber is inconsistent.
Dr. Cutler testified that;l) he did not tell Davidhizar on February 19,2002 that he
had terminated his contract with OMC (R. 838 at p. 36, line 15 to R. 839 p. 37, line 7);
and 2) his decision to terminate his contract with OMC was made during or after his
conversation with Davidhizar on February 19,2002 (R. 840 at p. 52, line 17 to R. 841 p.
53, line 5). Fisher also testified that Dr. Cutler had never informed him prior to February
18,2002 that he wanted to or intended to cancel or terminate his contract with OMC. (R.
at 3724 41)
Coder testified: 1) that he was told by Attorney Fisher that since Coder was not
working for OMC and Fisher was not licensed to perform medical billing for doctors, the
doctors' contracts would have to be changed to leases and that Fisher had spoken to some
of the doctors to determine if a change in their contracts would be acceptable to them (R.
848 at p. 241 ,line 20 to R. 849 p. 242, line 8); 2) that he was told by Fisher that Dr.
Cutler's contract was going to be changed to a lease agreement or that he is negotiating to
make it a lease agreement (R. at 846, p. 206, lines 18-25) 3) that he was told that the lease
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would require Dr. Cutler to pay the amount of the payment Fisher was making on the
table plus ten percent (R. at 844, p. 116, line 16 to p. 117, line 16); 4) that he told
Davidhizar about the terms of the lease agreement (id.); and 5) that Davidhizar stated that
if the doctors accepted the terms of the lease that he would accept the lease agreement.
(Id.)
Davidhizar testified in deposition that Dr. Cutler told him that he negotiated a new
contract with Fisher and agreed to pay the loan payment plus 10%, not that Dr. Cutler
intended to change his contract. (R. at 653, p. 93, lines 6-12). Davidhizar also testified in
deposition that Dr. Cutler told him that he had terminated his contract not that he intended
to terminate the contract. (R. at 631, p. 54, lines 13-25)
The contradictions in testimony demonstrate that Davidhizar's evidence does not
have the quantum or quality needed to satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof
and creates serious or substantial doubt that Dr. Cutler terminated or intended to terminate
his contract prior to the meeting on February 18,2002.
In addition, the fact that Dr. Cutler did not terminate his contract untilfivedays
after he met with Davidhizar is further proof that Davidhizar's, McOmber's and Coder's
testimony cannot be believed and lacks the quantum and quality necessary to meet the
clear and convincing standard of proof and adds to the serious or substantial doubt that
Dr. Cutler terminated or intended to terminate his contract prior to the meeting on
February 18,2002 or that he told Davidhizar, McOmber, or Coder that he had.
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Davidhizar also argues that Dr. Jeppsen's table had not been in operation for 4-6
weeks and there had been problems with the billing company in collecting income.
Davidhizar knew the problems with Dr. Jeppsen's table because he had the accounting
records.
Contrary to Davidihizar's assertion, he did not include the alleged problems with
Dr. Jeppsen's contract in his memorandum opposing the summary judgment motion but
referred to it in his opposition to the motion in limine filed nearly 29 months after Fisher
filed his summary judgment motion. (R. 624-628; R. at 1186 f 13) Dr. Jeppsen's
problems were not raised by Davidhizar in his response to the summary judgment and
therefore, should not be considered on appeal.
C.

Davidhizar Did Not Present Clear and Convincing Evidence That He
Justifiably Relied on Fisher's Alleged Misrepresentations.

Davidhizar argues that reasonable reliance is usually a question for the jury to
determine and Fisher's facts being based on hearsay, supported by confusing and
ambiguous record references, and based on documentsfromthe record for which no
authentication or explanations are offered establish that the trial court correctly denied the
motion for summary judgment.
Davidhizar argues that Fisher failed to offer any admissible evidence
demonstrating that the documents showing that the medical tables were losing money
were received by Davidhizar.
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Contrary to Davidhizar's assertion, Fisher did demonstrate that Davidhizar had
received the accounting records that showed the tables were losing money. [Brief of
Appellee/Cross-Appellant at p. 8, ^[27 to p. 10, f41]. Fisher presented testimony from
Nash, Coder and Davidhizar establishing that Davidhizar had the accounting records of
OMC.
Davidhizar also argues that the documents referred to by Fisher reference changes
that would be made to remedy the loss of income and are inconsistent with the amoimt of
income being generated by the OMC contracts and the status of such contracts. However,
Davidhizar fails to cite to any documents that support his argument that the documents
referenced changes to remedy the loss of income, and has not demonstrated how such
language would prove that Davidhizar did reasonably rely on any of Fisher's
representations. All of the documents referred to by Fisher show that the tables were
losing money and that the attempts to remedy the loss of income had failed.
Davidhizar argues that the records delivered to Nash were incomplete, etc. and that
he didn't see them and that Fisher has failed to present admissible evidence that they were
delivered or accurately portrayed OMC'sfinancialstatus.2
Contrary to Davidhizar's assertions, Davidhizar did have the accounting records.
(R. at 793 to 801)

2

Davidhizar raises for thefirsttime on appeal that the accounting records may not
accurately portray OMC'sfinancialstatus and therefore should not be considered by the Court.
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Davidhizar argues that the law allows him to justifiably rely on positive assertions
of fact without independent investigation. However, he does not state what positive
assertions of fact he justifiably relied on. And rightfully so because there are none.
Davidhizar also argues that Fisher's assertion that Davidhizar relied on Nash in
determining to enter into the Agreement isflawedbecause: 1) the assertion contradicts
Davidhizar's own testimony about reliance on Fisher's representations; 2) Nash's opinion
as an accountant was only one of the factors upon which Davidhizar relied in making his
decision; and 3) Nash heard and relied on the same misrepresentations in making his
recommendation to Davidhizar.
First, Davidhizar's assertion that he relied only on Fisher's representations is
contradicted by Davidhizar's own deposition testimony that "..I know I would not have
signed that agreement if he [Nash] hadn't said it looks reasonable." (R. at 828 at lines 1418). Second, Davidhizar admits in his argument that he relied on Nash's opinion to enter
into the Agreement. Third, Nash had complete accounting records from which he advised
Davidhizar and prepared tax returns for OMC and therefore knew thefinancialstatus of
OMC and did not rely on Fisher's representations.
Finally, Davidhizar argues that his knowledge that the doctors could terminate their
contracts on thirty day written notice does not affect his reliance on Fisher's
representations because if he had known the problems with the contracts he could have
properly evaluated the risks.
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Davidhizar knew that the contracts were subject to a thirty day termination notice.
He also told Coder that if the contracts were changed to a lease providing payment of the
loan amount plus 10% he would accept them. Therefore, he was willing to accept the
lease that he claims Dr. Cutler had with Fisher. He also knew of the collection problems
with Dr. Jeppsen because he had the financial records. Therefore, before signing the
agreement, he knew the situation with Jeppsen and had considered the risk.
It is clear in reviewing the evidence that it does notriseto quantum and quality of
proof necessary to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof and there are serious
doubts as to whether Davidhizar relied on the representations of Fisher.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Fisher respectfully requests the Court to reverse the
trial court's ruling denying Fisher's motion to strike Davidhizar's opposing memorandum
and the trial court's ruling denying Fisher's motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 26th day of August, 2010.
DARWIN C. FISHER, P.C.

Darwin C. Fisher
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
David Fisher
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